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China’s Building of a Blue-Water Fleet 
 
By Gareth Pearson,1 Florida International University 
 
 
In recent years the People’s Republic of China has begun to exhibit 
a more aggressive naval policy as a result of its decision to 
switch its naval force from a primarily green-water fleet (coastal) 
to a blue-water fleet (expeditionary) (“China’s New,” n.d.). This 
decision has brought China to loggerheads not only with other local 
East and South Asian powers such as India and Japan, but also with 
the predominant blue-water power of the world, the United States, 
that sees its supremacy threatened (“When Grand,” n.d.). Why would 
China embark on a route that would pit it against the world naval 
superpower, the United States, which has a huge lead on China in 
terms of naval blue-water power? Why would China try to challenge 
and match the U.S. Navy’s eleven aircraft carriers (“The World’s,” 
n.d.)? What could compel China to embark on a plan that would so 
disrupt the balance of power in the waters around Asia? To fully 
understand the Chinese government’s decision, one must first look 
at Chinese import figures and Chinese trade routes. 
 
China’s booming economy is driven by its massive production and 
exporting of cheap goods. However, to assemble those goods and 
sustain its export-driven economy, China has had to import more 
and more raw materials, oil, and minerals/ores as its economy has 
become more and more modern (“China’s Plan,” n.d.). The amounts of 
minerals and raw materials imported are staggering, with bauxite, 
copper, iron ore, and oil being some of the most important. From 
1987 to 2007, Chinese imports of bauxite went from “323,000 metric 
tons to more than 30 million metric tons” (“China’s New,” n.d.). 
Consequently, imports rose from only 9 percent of bauxite consumed 
to more or less 50 percent (“China’s New,” n.d.).  
 
Chinese copper imports between 1987 and 2007 rose from 116,000 
metric tons to over 3 million metric tons (“China’s New,” n.d.). 
During the same time period, China’s copper imports as a percentage 
of total consumed copper rose from 25 percent to “a whopping 76 
percent in 2007” (“China’s New,” n.d.).  Iron ore imports have 
risen from “11 million metric tons to more than 440 million metric 
tons” between 1987 and today (“China’s New,” n.d.).  At the time 
of publication, China imported 35% of the iron ore it consumed 
(“China’s New,” n.d.). Regarding oil, “in 2005, Chinese oil 
consumption rose to twice the rate of domestic production” 
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(“China’s New,” n.d.). “By 2008, China passed Japan as the world’s 
second-largest oil importer” (“China’s New,” n.d.). 
 
As China found that its imports grew as it transitioned from an 
agrarian to an industrial economy (“When Grand,” n.d.), China’s 
routes of importation also changed. Historically speaking, China 
has been a traditionally land-based power. Indeed, China is famous 
for its isolationism, which is why “for much of its history, China 
was largely able to rely on its own natural resources to support 
its population” (“China’s New,” n.d.). Whatever items that were 
not produced in China were brought into the country via land trade 
routes such as the famous Silk Road that connected China with much 
of the rest of Asia and even reached all the way to Europe (“China’s 
New,” n.d.). The Silk Road had been China’s main trade route for 
centuries, but when China was invaded by and subsequently governed 
by the Mongols, “the routes were once again secured and expanded” 
(“China’s New,” n.d.). This further decidedly oriented China’s 
trade preferences to land-based routes (“China’s New,” n.d.). 
 
However, with the change in its economy, China has now found that 
it no longer can produce most of what it consumes on its own soil 
(“China’s New,” n.d.). Not only that, China’s trade routes have 
now begun to change from primarily land-based, to primarily sea-
based ones (“China’s New,” n.d.), replacing the traditional Silk 
Road. Today, China’s “vital supply lines and trade routes” extend 
“from the Middle East through the Indian Ocean” and then swing 
around the Strait of Malacca until reaching China (“China’s Plan,” 
n.d.). China’s main supply lines are now “the strategic Malacca 
Strait between Malaysia and Indonesia; through which flows much of 
China’s inbound shipping, including vital oil and minerals” (“It’s 
Springtime,” n.d.). The reasons for this change are simple. First, 
given the massive amount of imported raw materials China now needs, 
it is much cheaper to import them via the sea than by land. Second, 
so many of those needed raw materials, resources, and minerals now 
come from so far away in the world, it is much quicker to send 
them by sea. 
 
Given the information above, the importance of the importation of 
natural resources, raw materials, minerals, and oil to the Chinese 
economy cannot be understated. In fact, the Chinese economy is, in 
many respects, dependent on imports to sustain itself. The 
weakness, then, of the Chinese economy is that it is dependent 
upon the imports that flow through open sea lanes. Whoever can 
block those sea lanes can effectively bring the Chinese economy to 
its knees (Blazevic, 2009). This inherent weakness makes these sea 
lanes a matter of geopolitical and strategic importance to the 
Chinese government. A decision had to be taken as to what to do 
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about this inherent weakness of the Chinese economic system. The 
viable options for China were to “accept the vulnerability” of the 
routes, to reduce that vulnerability, or to try and eliminate the 
vulnerability of the routes (“China’s New,” n.d.). Each of these 
three policy options considered by the Chinese government had some 
benefits, but also varying risks. 
 
The first possible option for China to pursue was to accept the 
vulnerability of its sea lanes (“China’s New,” n.d.). If a deciding 
factor to be considered was the cost of attempting to secure sea 
lanes by building a bigger navy, or the cost of reducing import 
lane vulnerabilities by shifting some of them back to land routes, 
then this would be the winning option. Accepting the vulnerability 
of its sea lanes would not only have required no money to be 
invested in protecting them, but no time, effort, or diversion of 
attention from other existing goals of the Chinese government. 
China’s sea lanes are quite long, ranging from China all the way 
to the Middle East (“China’s Plan,” n.d.). Securing them would 
require considerable effort, and a huge investment to support the 
correspondingly huge navy needed to do the job.  
 
Additionally, this option would have been best “particularly if 
the cost of developing and deploying naval protection exceeds the 
potential risk and cost of a disruption of trade” that would be 
accompanied by China trying to secure its trade routes for itself 
(“China’s New,” n.d.). The sea lanes China considers vital to 
control also overlap with other nations’ interests, namely: India, 
Japan, and the United States (“China’s Plan,” n.d.). By not trying 
to secure its import sea lanes, it would avoid possible 
confrontation with all of these powers.  
 
In the end though, the option of accepting the vulnerability of 
China’s sea lanes was not accepted by its government because the 
single con of such an option outweighed all the pros: China could 
not afford the potential for another maritime power to blockade 
China and cripple the Chinese economy (Blazevic, 2009). The 
financial benefits of no expenditures to secure the sea lanes could 
not outweigh the possible geostrategic disaster for China of a 
blockade. The option of the Chinese government allying itself with 
another naval power to attempt to protect the sea lanes using 
another country’s naval forces (“China’s Plan,” n.d.), was also 
rejected for the same reason: too much dependence on unforeseen 
circumstances. Whatever power China would try to use to protect 
its maritime interests could exploit China’s need for its 
benevolence, and force the Chinese government to concede 
bargaining chips in its political and economic arsenal in exchange 
for continued sea lane protection. The United States, for instance, 
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might ask for China to recognize Taiwan officially, or to stop 
keeping its currency artificially low, things the Chinese 
government could never accept. 
 
China’s second possible option would have been to reduce the 
vulnerability of its sea lanes by “diversifying trade routes and 
patterns, including pushing into Central Asia and Southeast Asia” 
(“China’s New,” n.d.). Under this option, China would follow its 
historical precedent and focus on the old Silk Road and other land 
routes. The advantage of such a move would be that it would secure 
some of its importation routes by shifting them to land, making 
them more secure by land than they would be by sea. This option 
would be costly. Sea transport has always been the cheapest form 
of transportation, so by China switching its import lanes from the 
sea to land, transportation costs would rise. This, in turn, would 
mean that the costs of the materials for the Chinese producers of 
export goods would rise, forcing higher costs of Chinese exports. 
However, to the Chinese government, this option would most 
certainly not be as pricey as a possible blockade of China by a 
foreign power that could result from accepting China’s sea lanes’ 
vulnerabilities. This option would also not be as expensive as the 
costs of developing a massive blue-water fleet. However, this 
option was ultimately rejected because of the variety of cons it 
contained.  
 
Costs are implicit in all policy choices, but this one had too 
many. First, the possible financial savings entailed by this plan 
did not outweigh the geostrategic advantages of securing the trade 
routes for China. Second, although using overland importation 
routes would make the routes less vulnerable, they would still be 
vulnerable. This option would have importation lanes go through 
countries’ actual territory, not just areas of maritime influence. 
This dependency would allow those countries to demand concessions 
from the Chinese.  This option is preferable to unsecured sea 
lanes, but not preferable to secured sea lanes. Third, in order to 
recreate the old Silk Road, and to ensure its trade routes were 
not taken advantage of by the Central Asian countries it would go 
through, China might have to project its political, economic, and 
military power over the Central Asian region. This would not sit 
well with Russia, which considers the former Soviet Union countries 
of Central Asia to be its own backyard (“Collective Security,” 
n.d.). All in all, this particular policy option seemed somewhat 
like a stop-gap measure to the Chinese government, a temporary, 
partial solution that could well invite too many other problems 
for too small a reward. 
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The third option—China protecting its trade routes—was eventually 
chosen by the Chinese government. This option would entail China 
creating a more “robust navy” (“China’s New,” n.d.) to secure its 
sea lanes against foreign intervention or exploitation. Such a 
plan of action requires immense effort and investment. Going 
against centuries of land-based isolationism, China would have to 
modernize its naval technologies to be able to compete for the 
other aforementioned powers with vested interests in China’s sea 
lanes (“China’s Plan,” n.d.). The capital ship of the modern era 
is the aircraft carrier, and since the United States has eleven 
(“The World’s,” n.d.), China would have to build quite a few to 
begin to compete with the strength a U.S. carrier group could 
project, let alone many of them. Since a modern carrier costs 
around $22 billion to build, the act of building an aircraft 
carrier alone would be a massive investment for China (Calore, 
n.d.). 
 
As far as the individual powers China might have to compete against 
for control over sea lanes, China might be able to fend off India 
and maybe even Japan, which is now considered by some to have the 
second best navy in the world (“Japan’s Taking,” n.d.), but 
certainly the United States would not be so easy to catch up to. 
Each of these three nations has [ts own reasons to butt heads with 
China. India has a vested interest in projecting power over the 
Indian Ocean, Japan has virtually the same import sea lanes as 
China, and the United States has an interest in controlling 
virtually all of the world’s oceans in general to ensure free trade 
(“When Grand,” n.d.). Only the United States has the capacity to 
control its field of interest however; Japan’s navy has a strong 
capacity but could be stronger, and India is still developing its 
navy (“When Grand,” n.d.). In 2009 alone, India “launched its first 
nuclear-powered submarine” as part of an ongoing effort to secure 
its area of interest of the Indian Ocean (“India Launches,” n.d.). 
Japan, which is in a stronger position than India to deal with 
China, has already been sending warnings to its military 
establishment and the world at large about growing Chinese naval 
ambitions, through its annual defense report (“Japan Warns,” 
n.d.). 
 
The details of China’s transition to a blue-water navy are 
relatively simple. Building a blue-water navy takes time, so while 
the Chinese have already started to build one, as can be seen by 
China’s production of its first aircraft carrier (“China 
Aircraft,” n.d.), China must resort to some temporary stop-gap 
measures in the meantime. The steps are, not necessarily in order; 
to create a maritime buffer around China’s regional waters using 
its existing green water fleet; expanding the range of its green 
Gareth Pearson 
6 
 
water fleet by basing it along the north of China’s import sea 
lanes in port cities; and by deploying asymmetrical counters to 
attempt to fight more advanced navies in the meantime (“When 
Grand,” n.d.). As part of its system to expand its maritime buffer 
and make it more difficult for foreign powers to operate their 
navies in Chinese green water areas, China has bought a total of 
four Russian Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers to bolster 
its green water fleet (“Sovremenny,” n.d.).  
 
An example of China focusing on asymmetrical counters is its work 
“with medium-range ballistic missiles, which have a longer range 
than its more conventional anti-ship missiles” (“When Grand,” 
n.d.) to take out enemy ships. Finally, an example of China’s 
expansion of its green-water navy’s operational area would be its 
port agreements with Gwadar, Chittagon, and Hambantota that allow 
China’s navy to operate from those bases without having to worry 
about the logistical hassles of operating so far from China 
(“China’s Plan,” n.d.). 
 
In the end, this policy option was chosen because its benefits 
outweighed its costs. China’s desire to control its sea lanes 
proved to be more alluring to the Chinese leadership than a half-
hearted measure to move them inland and open them up to other risks 
or accepting their vulnerability and open China up to a possible 
blockade. However, China’s decision to increase its naval size and 
capacity to try and control areas of interest claimed by three 
other countries could also increase the risk of conflict in the 
region (“When Grand,” n.d.). China was prepared to accept that 
risk if it meant being able to protect its Achilles’ heel: its 
import routes. “China’s economic shift and rising economic power 
meant that the risk of inaction finally outweighed the cost of 
ensuring maritime security” (“China’s New,” n.d.). 
 
The three options presented above; accepting vulnerability, 
reducing vulnerability, or eliminating vulnerability, were weighed 
carefully by the Chinese leadership (“China’s New,” n.d.). The 
final choice between them was that, for the second time in Chinese 
history after Zheng He, China set out to construct a blue-water 
navy (“China’s Plan,” n.d.). This decision to create a blue-water 
fleet is the focus of this case study. This decision was strategic; 
it carried with it a multitude of consequences not only for China, 
but for the balance of East Asian, South Asian, and possibly world 
maritime power. It will affect a multitude of actors, primarily 
China, the United States, Japan, and India, and yet the decision 
was made by the Chinese government. It was not a bilateral decision 
between itself and another country. If the decision were 
interactive in any way, it would be between the varying factions 
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of the Chinese government that had to agree with it. Such factions 
might include ship-builders, navy, army, air force, etc. The 
reasoning behind this course of action can be summarized in brief: 
China wished to secure its vulnerable sea import lanes to ensure 
the country’s economic stability. The decision taken was holistic, 
it in no way employed cognitive shortcuts. Rather, the Chinese 
government very carefully mapped out all possible alternatives and 
their individual ramifications before a final choice was selected.  
 
The ramifications of this decision could be immense. The global 
balance of naval power might be utterly altered if China succeeds 
in its blue-water navy policy. Or perhaps, if the United States 
and other powers seek to contain China, the latter may never get 
to develop its navy and may be forced to succumb to other nations’ 
control over its trade sea lanes. Whatever these ramifications may 
be, they are far in the future and unknown. The decision taken by 
China’s government was very recent and it has not yet been fully 
implemented, so it is too soon to determine whether it will succeed 
or fail. This case study was chosen for analysis to understand why 
China made this decision to upgrade its navy’s size and 
capabilities. The ramifications of that decision are known, but it 
is to be hoped that by understanding China’s motives, the United 
States may know how to best respond to this challenge and shape 
its ramifications to the United States’ interests. 
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